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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that voters in mass elections tend to be badly informed. If 
these voters do not know enough about the relationship between the policy consequences 
of electoral outcomes and their own interests, then electoral outcomes may not provide 
meaningful expressions of voter interests. Can campaign activity affect the relationship 
between voter interests and electoral outcomes? To answer this question, we use survey 
data from 35 comparable elections and a new empirical methodology (Dubin and Zeng's
[1991] heteroscedastic logit). The new methodology allows us to estimate the joint effect 
of voter information and interests on voting behavior in a way that is both theoretically 
justifiable and better at explaining the available data than traditional methods. We find 
that campaign activity increases the likelihood that electoral outcomes are responsive 
to (perhaps, otherwise badly informed) voter interests, when campaigners are able to 
exert costly and observable effort, are able to make credible statements and have the 
opportunity to engage in a vigorous and competitive campaign. 
When Do Campaigns Matter? 
Informed Votes, the Heteroscedastic Logit 
and the Responsiveness of Electoral Outcomes * 
Elisabeth R. Gerber Arthur Lupia 
1 Introduction 
Over thirty years ago, Downs predicted (1957, Chapter 13) and Campbell, Converse, 
Miller and Stokes 1960 found that voters in mass elections were likely to be badly informed 
about political matters. These studies provided a generation of scholars with a new 
perspective about the existence and extent of voter ignorance. As a result, it is now 
a widely held belief that voters in mass elections tend to be poorly informed about the 
policy consequences of electoral outcomes. While there are many reasons to be concerned 
about voter ignorance, perhaps the most important is that voters may not know enough 
about the relationship between the policy consequences of electoral outcomes and their 
own interests (however defined) to provide electoral contestants with an incentive to be 
responsive to voter interests. 
Whether an electoral outcome is a meaningful expression of voter interests or the prod­
uct of unmitigated confusion, depends on the ability of voters to express their interests 
in the act of voting. If voters are truly unable to understand the policy consequences of 
electoral outcomes, then an election result should be treated as little more than the prod­
uct of unmitigated confusion. If, on the other hand, voters can adapt to their uncertainty 
in a way that allows them to express their feelings about the type of future they desire, 
then an electoral outcome can legitimately be treated as an expression of voter interests. 
Which interpretation of an electoral outcome is appropriate depends on whether or not 
information sources-like campaigns help voters understand the relationship between their 
interests and the electoral alternatives they face. Unfortunately, the informative capacity 
of campaigns is only partially understood. 
"The authors wish to thank Mike Alvarez, Doug Dion, Jeff Dubin, Jim Granato, Gary Jacobson, Joni 
Hersch, Jonathan Katz, Rod Kiewiet, Rebecca Morton and Doug Rivers for their helpful comments. We 
also thank Jim Jacobs, Kristin Szakaly and Doug Tower for valuable research assistance. 
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One set of scholars argues that campaigns allow relatively uninformed and uninterestPd 
voters to cast votes similar to those they would have cast if they were better informed 
about the policy consequences of electoral outcomes (this set includes Brady and Snider­
man 1985, Feldman and Conover 1986, Lupia 1992, Popkin 1991 and Sniderman, Brody
and Tetlock 1991 ). Each of these scholars begins by identifying a set of campaign events
that could provide voters with cues about the consequences of electoral outcomes. Upon 
finding that some of these cues affect voter beliefs and/ or behavior, they go on to argue 
that when campaigns provide these cues voters can overcome the problems associated 
with a lack of knowledge and interest in political matters. In short, these scholars argue 
that campaigns increase the likelihood that electoral outcomes reflect the interests that 
voters would express if they were well informed. 
While these arguments are compelling, we ·often observe campaigns that are ineffec­
tive and more generally observe that campaigns differ in their ability to affect voters. 
Consider your own experience. Certainly, you have found some campaign claims to be 
more credible than others and some campaigners to be more persuasive than others. 
From some campaigners you have obtained reliable information about the policy conse­
quences of electoral outcomes, while from other campaigners you have learned nothing. 
Whether or not campaigns are sufficient to convert electoral outcomes from the product 
of unmitigated confusion to a meaningful expression of voter interests seems to depend 
critically on particular characteristics of campaign activity. In what follows, we use both 
theoretical and empirical methods to identify the conditions under which campaigns do 
(and do not) lead to electoral outcomes that represent voter interests. 
1.1 Research Plan
The goal of our research is to examine how campaign activity affects the relationship 
between voter interests and electoral outcomes - - a relationship we ca.II responsiveness. 
We define responsiveness as a. measure of the correspondence between the policy conse­
quences of an electoral outcome and a voter's (or a group of voters) policy preferences. In 
defining our responsiveness variable, we recognize that the complexity of electoral issues 
can make voters uncertain about the types of candidates or policies that a.re consistent 
with their own best interests. The existence of this type of uncertainty implies that a 
voter's revealed preferences may not be the same as the preferences she would state if 
she understood the relationship between the policy consequences of electoral outcomes 
and her own well being. We call the preference a voter would have if she knew all that 
was known about the relationship between specific policies and her own well being as 
her informed··.pr-efer-ence.1 -M/e,,.fiefine. an mfewmed -t-e- ttS ·the -vote ·that a voter would
cast if she was casting a. vote consistent with her informed preferences. (Notice that to 
cast an informed vote a voter need not possess complete information or know all that 
is known about the consequences of her actions.) Finally, we define responsiveness with 
1 We assume that voters have preferences and that their level of informedness affects how they express 
these preferences. \Ve expect that as a voter obtains the ability to link her actions with partieular 
consequences, she becomes better able to express her informed preferences. 
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respect to a voter's informed preference, and say that the responsiveness of an electoral 
outcome increases as does the dggree of similarity between the policy alternative that 
would receive her informed vote and the alternative that wins the election. 
For instance, if my informed preferences lead me to favor Policy X over Policy Y. and
Policy Y wins a referendum, we say that the electoral outcome is less responsive to my
preferences than would have been the case had Policy X won the election. In contrast, if
the informed preferences of an electorate were to lead 57% to favor Policy Y over Policy
X, then we say that the electoral outcome is more responsive to the preferences of that
57% than would have been the case if Policy X had won. For expositional clarity, and
without a loss of generality, we will, henceforth, use the term "responsiveness" to mean 
"responsiveness to the preferences of a majority of voters." 
To identify which campaign characteristics are likely to affect responsiveness we first 
examine a spatial model that was developed in Gerber and Lupia 1992. In the model, 
interested parties send campaign messages to voters in an attempt to affect voting be­
havior. Voters observe certain types of campaign activity and may be able to use their 
observations to form relatively accurate inferences about the policy consequences of the 
possible electoral outcomes. Our primary findings from the spatial model are: 
1. Voters can learn a.bout the policy consequences of electoral outcomes from their
observation of a campaigner's costly campaign effort (where the knowledge they
obtain from this observation is independent of the content of campaign claims).
2. A campaigner's credibility affects what voters can learn from claims about the policy
consequences of an electoral outcome.
3. An increase in the level of campaign competition leads to an increase in responsive­
ness if and only if the added campaigner is able to affect voter beliefs about the 
policy consequences of the electoral outcome.
4. In a broad range of cases, and all else constant, campaigns that argue against a
change in the status quo are likely to have a greater impact on voting behavior than
do campaigns tha.t argue for such a change.
We then use campaign spending <la.ta and election results from 36 direct legislation
elections and nearly 40,000 survey responses to questions about these elections to test 
hypotheses about effects of campaign activity on responsiveness. Our definition of re­
sponsiveness mandates that our estimation of this relationship be preceded by an estimate 
of "informed voting behavior." This task turns out to be our most challenging, and from 
the perspective of the empirical political scientist, perhaps the most interesting. 
For initial motivation on how to estimate informed voting behavior, we turn to the 
logic of the spatial model which, like much of the recent work in political psychology 
(see Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990 or Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991 for reviews 
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of this research), suggests that all voters do not make decisions in the samf' way. \Ve 
convert a primary theoretical finding into the following fundamental empirical prc>mise: 
individuals who are relatively knowledgeable about the policy consequences of electoral 
outcomes are more likely to be casting their informed votes than those who are less 
knowledgeable. This premise leads us to assume that each voter's revealed preference 
over electoral alternatives (vote intention) is a noisy function of his or her informed 
preference. Therefore, we represent each voter's revealed preference as a single draw 
from a distribution whose mean is the voter's informed preference on that issue. 
For any individual, we assume that the mean of her distribution is determined by 
measurable socioeconomic characteristics and election specific variables while the shape 
of her distribution is determined by how much she knows about the measure. From our 
initial premise it follows that relatively informed voters have distributions with smaller 
variances around the mean and that relatively uninformed voters have distributions with 
larger variances (or that a relatively well informed voter's revealed preference is closer to 
her informed preference than would be the case for a relatively uninformed voter). This 
formulation of voter choice presents us with a classic heteroscedasticity problem in which 
the error variance associated with using revealed preferen�e is expected to decrease as a 
respondent's level of information increases and vice versa. 
Since available data measures revealed voter preference as a binary variable (e.g. re­
sponses to vote intention questions), we employ a heteroscedastic logit model (developed 
in Dubin & Zeng 1991 ). This method of estimation differs from more traditional methods
in that it allows us to estimate the relationship between relevant socioeconomic charac­
teristics, voting behavior and (the degree of heteroscedasticity due to differences in) voter 
knowledge. Predicted values from the heteroscedastic logit allow us to estimate how re­
spondents would vote if they were as well informed as the most informed respondents 
in the survey. These predictions provide our estimate of each voter's "informed vote.� 
We then aggregate individual level informed vote estimates to obtain an estimate of the 
electorate's informed vote. Finally, we take the difference between our estimate of the 
informed electorate's behavior and the actual election result as our measure of respon­
siveness (e.g. the closer are informed and actual behavior, the greater is responsiveness 
and vice versa). 
Our empirical results provide evidence that only certain types of campaign activity 
increase responsiveness and are consistent with the model's testable predictions. We find 
that an increase in the amount of campaign expenditure (our measure of costly campaign 
effort) increases responsiveness. This effect is greatest when the level of expenditure by 
opposing campaigns is relatively even. The implication of this finding is that large and 
hotly contested campaigns are more likely to increase responsiveness than are large one­
sided campaigns. In addition, we find that, all else constant, the effect of negative 
campaigns (campaigns against change) are more effective than campaigns that advocate 
change. Finally, a comparison of our results to those produced by more traditional 
methods of statistical analysis shows that the heteroscedastic logit allows us to achieve 
a substantially superior fit of the data and allows us to drav..· improved theoieticallj· 
justified inferences. 
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The result of our empirical and theoretical efforts is that we can identify which cam­
paigns matter. The ability to take costly and observable effort, the ability to make cred­
ible statements and the opportunity to engage in a vigorous and competitive campaign 
are characteristics that allow campaigners to affect voter beliefs. When campaigners 
can affect voter beliefs in this way, they generally increase the likelihood that informed 
votes are cast. It follows that if campaigners possess the characteristics just mentioned, 
then campaigns are likely to represent voter interests. When campaigners do not have 
these characteristics, then electoral outcomes are more likely to represent unmitigated 
confusion. 
Beyond any substantive merit that our findings possess, we believe that our research 
will be of interest to political scientists for two additional reasons. First, we are the first 
to use the heteroscedastic logit in a political science application and our experiences with 
it lead us to believe that this can be a useful method of estimation for, and a useful way 
to think about, empirical political science. Second, our research involves the integration 
of a formal theoretical model and rigorous empirical analysis. While the integration of 
theoretical and empirical principles is non-trivial, we believe that it is worthwhile and 
hope that the research experience we describe can provide a focal point for a constructive 
conversation about the benefits and dra.wba.cks of atte�pting to confront a single question 
with these two seldom united paradigms. 
Next, we briefly discuss the types of elections upon which our analyses focus. Then, we 
proceed to the analyses. We first describe the structure of and findings from the spatial 
model. Then, we conduct the empirical analysis. We conclude with a brief discussion of 
the policy implications of our findings. 
1.2 Direct Legislation Elections
To examine the relationship between campaign activity and responsiveness, we focus on 
direct legislation elections. 2 Focusing on direct legislation allows us to study aspects of · 
campaign activity that are difficult to isolate when focusing exclusively on candidate­
centered campaigns. It is important to realize, however, that the many obvious sim­
ilarities between direct legislation and candidate-centered elections make our findings 
generalizable to other sorts of campaigns in mass elections. 
The features of direct legislation that make it particularly useful for a study of the 
effect of campaigns are: 
· 
• Direct legislation elections provide a unique and rich setting for analyzing the effect
2These can be either initiative measures, where citizens place a measure on the ballot by petition, or 
referendum measures, which are piaced on the baiiot by the iegisiat.ure and ratified or rejected by the 
electorate. 
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of campaigns. Unlike recent presidential and other candidate centered elections, 
direct legislation campaigns tend not to be run by established political parties:· 
Instead, they are typically run by groups that form for the sole purpose of taking 
a position on a direct legislation measure that appears on a particular ballot. As a 
result, there are types of measurable variance in the dynamics of direct legislation 
campaigns that simply do not exist in more commonly studied types of elections. 
• Direct legislation voters select directly between an exogenously determined menu
of specific policy alternatives, as opposed to selecting a candidate who acts as a
policy agent. As a result and all else constant, the relationship between voter policy
preferences and voting behavior is relatively simple in. direct legislation elections.
• Direct legislation ballot measures tend to be long, technical, and complex (e.g. a
recent California ballot measure contained over 15,000 words). As a consequence,
voters often do not have a great deal of prior information about the electoral al­
ternatives and must rely, to a greater extent than in candidate-centered elections,
on political campaigns for information about the consequences of their election day
actions. This reliance is reinforced by the regular absence of two types of cues that
are commonly used by voters in candidate-centered elections: partisan endorsements
and relevant past histories.
• Finally, data on voting behavior in direct legislation elections is readily available.
Direct legislation elections occur regularly throughout the world, many in places
that conduct survey research.
2 Theoretical Analysis 
In this section, we present a brief, non-technical discussion of a spatial model of di­
rect legislation developed in Gerber and Lupia 1992. This overview shows how we have 
conceptualized the relationship between campaign activity, voter information and re­
sponsiveness. In addition, this presentation is suggestive of the motivation for important 
components of our empirical analysis. 
We model a direct legislation campaign as a one-shot game between a proponent, an 
opponent and n voters.3 The object of the game is to select one of two policies, called the
status quo and the ballot measure, that determines a payoff for all players. We assume 
that the proponent prefers the ballot measure to the status quo and that the opponent 
prefers the status quo to the ballot measure. Each of the two policies is represented as a 
point on the mtervaL{O, lf"1tnd ·eaclt player ·is ,a.ssttmed eta-nave ·single-peaked preferences
over policies (i.e. each has an ideal point and prefers policies that are relatively close to 
their own ideal point to policies that are relatively far). 
The game has two distinct stages. In the first stage, the proponent and opponent 
choose campaign strategies. In the second stage, the voters observe campaign activity 
30ur model can be characterized as a "setter model." See Rosenthal 1990 for a review. 
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and vote for either the ballot measure or the status quo. Majority rule determines which 
policy is selected. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that all aspects of the game are 
common knowledge. 
We now state otherwise. 'An important feature of our model is our treatment of 
uncertainty. Every player is uncertain about the relationship between the actions they 
can take and the consequences of those actions. The source of voter uncertainty is the 
spatial location (which could also be referred to as the content or policy consequence) 
of the ballot measure. We assume that the spatial location of the status quo is common 
knowledge, while the location of the ballot measure is determined by a single draw from a 
common knowledge distribution.4 We assume that the proponent and opponent observe 
this draw, but that voters do not. 5 This information asymmetry is justified by the 
following empirical observations: 
1. Direct legislation campaigns are typically run by groups who understand a ballot
measure well enough to organize an effort for or against it. Therefore, the proponent
and opponent are characterized as being relatively well informed.
2. The content of ballot measures are often complex relative to what voters know about
them at the beginning of a campaign. Therefore, voters are characterized as being
relatively poorly informed.
In sum, the effect of our assumptions about voter uncertainty is that each voter can be 
uncertain about whether their informed vote would be for the status quo or the ballot 
measure. 
The source of proponent and opponent uncertainty is the actual distribution of voter 
ideal points. We treat each voter's ideal point is as though it is drawn from a common 
knowledge distribution (although each voter's ideal point need not be drawn from the 
same distribution). We assume that every voter observes the result of only her draw. 
The effect of proponent and opponent uncertainty about any voter's ideal point (and, 
hence, the actual distribution of voter ideal points) is that neither knows exactly how 
their campaign strategy will affect the electoral outcome. 
A second important feature of our model is our treatment of campaigning as a costly 
activity. The substantive motivation for this conceptualization is our observation of the 
money and effort that proponents and opponents expend when they attempt to affect 
the outcome of direct legislation elections (by waging a campaign). Our simplifying 
interpretation-of these costs is that a cost is ·the amount that the proponent or opponent 
expects they must spend to run a "winning" campaign. Therefore, we assume that players 
do not choose the magnitude of their costs - a player's only decision is whether or not 
4These assumptions represent voter uncertainty about the relationship between their own well being 
and the electoral outcome. Since the status quo is the existing state of policy, it is reasonable to assume 
that voters know more about it than the ballot rneasure. 
5The case where some voters know more than this follows straightforwardly from our model. 
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to pay the costs she faces. For expositional simplicity, we also assume that once a cost 
is paid its magnitude is common knowledge.6 In contrast, we treat voting as a costless 
activity.7 
2.1 The Extensive Form Game
The sequence of events is depicted as an extensive form game in Figure 1. The proponent .
moves first and must decide to whether or not to wage a costly campaign.8 In our model,
a campaign consists of a message sent to voters about the content of the ballot measure. 
The proponent's campaigu message is modeled as a simple left/right sigual. The signal 
"left" is understood to mean that the proponent claims the ballot measure is to the left 
of the status quo on the interval [O, l]. The signal "right" is defined accordingly. Since
we recognize that campaigners may have an incentive to provide misleading information, 
we do not restrict the proponent to the transmission of a truthful campaign message. 
Though the proponent is restricted to signaling either "left" or "right," the intuition 
provided by examining this type of communication is quite general. Since each player 
knows the location of her ideal point and the status quo, she has beliefs about whether 
she prefers points to the left or to the right of the status quo. Therefore, the messages 
"left" and "right" are equivalent to more general signals like "the ballot measure is better 
for you than the status quo" and "the ballot measure is worse for you than the status 
quo." We observe that many direct legislation campaign advertisements contain simple 
messages of this sort. 
To wage a campaign, the proponent must first must commit to pay the "cost of 
campaigning in support of the ballot measure." The magnitude of this cost depends 
on the opponent's future actions, specifically whether she decides to wage an opposing 
campaign. We model the proponent's commitment to wage a campaign as a contingent 
contract where she agrees to pay one price if the opponent does not wage a. campaign 
and another price if the opponent does decide to wage a campaign. 9 The effect of this 
assumption is to make the proponent uncertain about whether or not the opponent will 
also run a campaign. 
After the proponent chooses a campaign strategy, the opponent observes the propo­
nent 's campaign activity and then decides whether or not to wage a campaign against 
60ur results actually depend on the less restrictive assumption that all players have common prior 
beliefs about the magnitude of any cost. 
7This simplification allows us to disregard possible differences bet.ween voters and non-voters. Since 
our definition of responsiveness depends only on the preferences of voters, it is without a loss of generalit.y 
that we treat voting as a costless activity. 
8In this model, we focus on the campaign process and treat the selection of the ballot measure location 
as exogenous. In Gerber and Lupia 1992 the determination of the ballot measure's location is treated as 
endogenous. In that model, it is necessary that the proponent move first, while in the current analysis, 
the order is irrelevant. 
9\x./e obse1ve that in actual elections, the ievei of competition seems to affect a campaigner's choice 
of strategy, and, therefore, her costs. 
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the ballot measure. If the opponent wants to campaign against the ballot measure she 
must pay the exogenously determined "cost of waging an opposing campaign." Paying 
this cost allows the opponent to send the electorate a left/right signal, which is defined in 
the same way as the proponent's campaign message was defined. As with the proponent, 
we do not restrict the opponent to the transmission of a truthful campaign message. 
Voters move last in this game. We assume that voters observe all campaign messages 
and know how much the proponent and opponent paid to wage their campaigns. Voters 
may, however, be uncertain about whether or not any particular campaign message is 
truthful. 10 Voters end the game by casting a vote for either the ballot measure or the 
status quo. Majority (or supermajority) rule determines whether the ballot measure or 
the status quo is the final outcome. 
2.2 Findings
In the first part of this section, we describe the effect of observable costly campaign effort 
and campaigner credibility on voter beliefs about the policy consequences of electoral 
outcomes. In the second part, we describe the relationship between campaign activity 
and direct legislation responsiveness. All of the findings presented in this section are 
based on equilibria derived in Gerber and Lupia 1992. 
2.2.1 Campaigns and Voter Inference 
Let c• be the cost actually paid by a campaigner (this discussion applies to either the 
proponent or the opponent). Because the campaigner need not pay c• to attempt to affect 
the electoral outcome, the fact that she does so conveys information to voters. From the 
observation that the campaigner has waged a costly campaign, voters can infer that the 
ballot measure and the status quo must be far enough apart to justify her expenditure -
- otherwise, she would accept the status quo and not expend c*. Therefore, when a voter 
observes costly effort she learns that the ballot measure cannot lie within a specific range 
on the interval [O, 1 J that includes the status quo and points close to it. An example of this
type of effect is displayed in Figure 2. A voter's ability to identify a range within which 
the ballot measure cannot lie allows her to form a more accurate inference about the 
spatial location (policy consequences) of the ballot measure. For example, a. voter who is 
given a single opportunity to guess the exact location of the ballot measure - or which of 
a finite number of non-overlapping intervals the ballot measure lies within - before and 
after obsendng. costly effort, is.,llWre.Jikely .to-.g.uess.-r.r,ectly-aiter .the observation. It 
follows that the larger the observable level of campaigner effort, the wider is the interval 
10The assumption that voters can observe campaign effort and messages is without loss of generality 
to a class of assumptions where voter perceptiveness on these matters is impaired. We also make the 
simplifying and substantively justifiable assumption that voters are not sophisticated enough to draw a 
unique inference about the content of the ballot measure from the observation that the opponent does 
not wage a campaign in support of the status quo. 
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in which the voters know the ballot measure cannot lie and the more accurate are voter 
inferences, all else constant. Since the ability to cast informed votes requires accurate 
inferences about the policy consequences of an electoral outcome, a voter's ability to 
observe costly campaign effort increases the likelihood that an informed vote is cast. 
Notice that the improvement in voter inferences due to the observation of costly cam­
paign effort is independent of the content of campaign messages. Whether or not a voter 
can also use the content of a campaign message to learn about the policy consequences of 
an electoral outcome depends on her beliefs about its truthfulness, which itself depends 
on the campaigner's credibility. With respect to the issue of credibility, we recognize that 
in many collective choice situations, those who have the resources to provide information 
sometimes have an incentive to mislead those who receive it. To identify the effect of 
an information provider's credibility on voter inferences, we compare two extreme cases. 
In the first case, no voter is able to verify whether or not the content of a message is 
truthful (a minimally credible campaign message). In the second case, the content of a 
message is known to be truthful (a perfectly credible campaign message). 11 
In the case of the minimally credible campaign message, message content does not 
necessarily depend on the true directional relationship between the ballot measure and the 
status quo (campaigners can lie). Without additional information about the campaigner, 
it follows from Crawford and Sobel 1982 that voters cannot use the message's content to 
form a more accurate inference about the location of the ballot measure (it is regarded 
as "cheap talk"). Figure 3 provides a depiction of what voters learn from the content of 
a minimally credible campaign message - - nothing. When campaign costs are c• > 0, 
however, the total effect of a campaign that includes a minimally credible campaign 
message is the same as that displayed in Figure 2. In this case, all of the change in voter 
beliefs is induced by the observation of costly campaign effort. In contrast, voters may 
be able to make improved inferences from the content of a perfectly credible campaign 
message. Voters can infer that the ballot measure is not to the right of the status 
quo when they receive the perfectly credible message "the ballot measure is to the left 
of the status quo." While this type of message is not sufficient for voters to infer the 
exact location of the ballot measure, it does allow them to eliminate ranges in which the 
ballot measure cannot lie. Figure 4 isolates the effect that the content of the perfectly 
credible campaign message "left" has on voter beliefs about the location of the ballot 
measure. Comparing Figure 4 with Figure 3 shows the effect of campaigner credibility on
voter inferences. Notice that when an campaign message is perfectly credible, voters can 
generally form more accurate inferences about the location of the ballot measure than 
when the campaign message is minimally credible. 
11 A comprehensive study elf the effects of credibility on the behavior of a direct legislation proponent 
and incompletely informed voters is the subject. of Lupia 1993. A more general review of the effect of 
signaling on political decision making is provided in Banks 1991. 
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3 An Empirical Study of Responsiveness 
We now estimate a.n empirical model tha.t a.Hows us to test for empirical evidence of the 
hypotheses relating campaign characteristics to responsiveness tha.t our analysis of the 
spatial model generated. This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, we use 
data. consisting of nearly 40,000 survey responses to estimate the responsiveness of 36 
actual direct legislation elections. In the second part, we relate our estimates of respon­
siveness to aggregate data about campaign characteristics to estimate the determinants 
of responsiveness across elections. 
The first a.nd most difficult task is to estimate a. measure of responsiveness. Our 
definition of responsiveness implies tha.t a narrowing of the ga.p between actua.l aggregate 
direct legislation electoral outcomes and the electorate's informed vote is equivalent to 
an increase in responsiveness. It follows that creating a responsiveness measure requires 
knowledge of each voter's informed vote. However, most voters have limited information 
about political matters, making informed votes generally unobservable. As a result, the 
first step in the creation of a responsiveness measure is to estimate informed votes. 
The intuition underlying our estimation of informed votes is derived from the spatial 
model. In short, this estimation is built on the (subsequently tested) premise that voters 
with higher levels of political information are better able to link the policy consequences 
of an electoral outcome to the actions they can take in the voting booth. Our estimation 
of a.n individual's informed vote, then, in a given direct legislation election, is derived 
from the relationship between an individual's level of information, her measured socioe­
conomic characteristics and her reported policy preferences (measured as her stated vote 
intention). Once we obtain estimates of each individual's informed vote, we use a straight­
forward aggregation procedure to estimate the electorate's aggregate informed vote. '11/e 
then take the difference between our estimate of the informed electorate's behavior and 
the actual election result as our measure of responsiveness. 
In the second part of our analysis, we test for evidence that campaigns with certain 
characteristics help to produce responsive direct legislation outcomes. We specify an 
empirical model that uses our measure of responsiveness as the dependent variable, and 
measures of campaign expenditure, competition and ballot measure characteristics as 
independent variables. The results of this analysis provide empirical support for the 
relationships between campaign activity and responsiveness identified in the analysis of 
the spatial model. 
3.1 The First Task: Estimating a Measure of Responsiveness
We begin with the premise that individuals who are relatively well informed are more 
likely to be casting their informed votes. This premise leads us to assume that each voter's 
revealed preference over electoral alternatives, that is, her reported preference or vote 
intention, is a noisy function of her informed preference. The responses of individuals who 
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2.2.2 Determinants of Electoral Responsiveness 
In equilibrium, a campaigner pays to wage an election if and only if she believes that 
doing so is necessary to ensure that the alternative she prefers wins the election. We also 
find that a campaign is competitive when at least one campaigner's prior beliefs about her 
opponent's ability and/or willingness to affect the electoral outcome, lead her to choose a 
different strategy than would have been the case if she had no such uncertainty. Finally, 
comparative statics reveal that the presence of campaigners who can exert observable and 
costly effort, or the presence of campaigners who voters believe to be somewhat credible, 
is generally sufficient to increase the likelihood that relatively uninformed voters cast 
informed votes. As a consequence, the presence of campaigners who can affect voter 
beliefs are necessary for electoral outcomes to be responsive to the interests of otherwise 
uninformed electorates. 
The effects of campaign activity on responsiveness manifest themselves in three ways 
that can be tested empirically. First, we expect voters who observe higher levels of 
costly campaign effort to form more accurate inferences about the policy consequences 
of electoral outcomes than can voters who observe lower levels of campaign effort, all else 
constant. This implies that high levels of costly campaign effort should be associated 
with relatively responsive electoral outcomes. 
Second, we expect any aspect of campaign activity that increases the credibility of 
campaign messages to also be associated with more responsive electoral outcomes. Since 
the credibility of campaign messages is often difficult to measure empirically, our test of 
this effect rests on the assumption that vigorous competition in the provision of campaign 
information increases the likelihood that a campaigner sends a truthful message. Sup­
porting this assumption is our belief that the presence of a vigorous and able competitor, 
who is likely to have an incentive to expose untruthful campaign information, makes 
it more costly for a campaigner to send untruthful messages. If this belief is correct, 
then we expect that highly competitive and costly campaigns will increase campaigner 
credibility which will both increase the likelihood that informed votes are cast and be 
associated with greater responsiveness. 
Finally, we expect campaigns against the ballot measure to be more effective than 
campaigns for the ballot measure. This expectation comes from our belief that voters 
are risk averse and that it is relatively easy for a campaigner to convince voters that the 
magnitude of the change (from the status quo) suggested by the ballot measure is large 
enough to deter risk averse voters from choosing the ballot measure. Our beliefs about the 
relative effectiveness of claims that "change is bad" are influenced by the fact that, in our 
model, even minimally credible campaigners can persuade voters of the magnitude of the 
difference between electoral outcomes as a result of her observable and costly effort. Our 
results are substantiated by the scholarship of Lowenstein (1982) and Jacobson ( 1983), 
both of whom suggest that voters treat the status quo (incumbents) differently than they 
treat agents of change (challengers). 
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have more information are assumed to be "contaminated" by less noise, and the responses 
of individuals with less information to be contaminated by more noise. Therefore, we 
represent each voter's revealed preference as a single draw from a distribution whose mean 
is the voter's informed preference on that issue. For any individual, we assume that the 
mean of this distribution is determined by measurable socioeconomic characteristics and 
election specific variables. The shape of this distribution is determined by how much the 
individual knows about the measure.12 From our initial premise it follows that relatively 
informed voters have distributions with smaller variances around the mean and that 
relatively uninformed voters have distributions with larger variances. An implication of 
this premise is that we expect a relatively well informed respondent's revealed preference 
to be closer, on average, to her informed preference than would be the case for a relatively 
uninformed respondent.13 
Figure 5 depicts the relationship between the theoretical and empirical concepts. In
the spatial model, a voter's beliefs about the content of a ballot measure are represented 
120ur assumptions about the relationship between information and informed preferences imply that 
the preference distributions of two individuals who have identical socio-economic characteristics and 
different levels of information will share a common mean but will have different variances. Supplemental 
analysis of the determinants of preferences for informed and uninformed respondents suggests that they 
are similar for the two groups, providing empirical justification for our assumption. Additionally, when 
we include a respondent's level of information as an explanatory variable in the supplemental analyses, we 
find little evidence of systematic differences in preferences between informed and uninformed respondents. 
These supplementary analyses are available upon request. 
130ur approach is similar to the one used in Bartels 1990 to estimate "enlightened preferences." Bartels 
assumes that an individual's enlightened preferences are determined by her social position. Furthermore, 
for the purpose of estimating enlightened preferences, he assumes that a respondent. 's level of informa­
tion and social position are independent. Given these two assumptions, which he recognizes as quite 
restrictive, Bartels estimates the relationship between policy preferences and social position using only 
the observations of respondents who the NES interviewer rates as "very high" in both "general level of 
information about politics and public affairs" and "apparent intelligence." He then uses coefficients from 
this estimation to calculate the enlightened preferences of both informed and uninformed respondents. 
For respondents who are not well informed, enlightened preferences are an estimate of the preferences 
they would have revealed if they processed information like a well informed person. Bartels' indepen­
dence assumption is critical since there must be a sufficient number of well informed persons with low 
social position to ensure that the estimates of enlightened preferences are consistent. 
While Bartels' approach is suitable for a study of preferences over general policy outcomes, we feel that 
it is less suitable for a study of preferences over specific electoral alternatives, like those considered in 
direct legislation. In particular, the complexity and specificity of the typical ballot measure, and the lack 
of traditional campaign cues, make us hesitant to adopt either Bartels' independence assumption or the 
assumption that uninformed voters would emulate the behavior of otherwise identical informed voters1 
if they themselves were well informed. Instead of assuming that well informed voters are expressing 
enlightened preferences, our model is based on the weaker assumption that well informed voters are 
more likely to express their informed preferences .than are JJninformed .lloters. 
Our analysis allows information and social position to be related. In fact, our estimation of the 
determinants of an individual's level of information, described in Table 2, provides evidence that such 
a relationship exists. Our conceptualization of revealed preferences as draws from a distribution means 
that we need not assume that high information voters always "get it right" and reveal their informed 
preferences, and that low information voters systematically "get it wrong." Rather, we need only make 
the assumption (supported by evidence reported in Table 5) that high information voters are more likely 
to report their informed preferences on any single draw. 
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as a probability distribution over [O, l ) . We explained that an increase in a voter's ability 
to form an accurate inference about the content of a ballot measure is accompanied 
by an increase in the weight assigned to the true location of the ballot measure in the 
voter's updated beliefs. In general, more accurate voter inferences lead to an increase 
in the likelihood that the voter casts an informed vote. The intuition underlying our 
empirical concept is similar. As the variance around the mean of a distribution decreases, 
the weight of the probability assigned to the mean of the distribution (assumed to be 
the voter's informed preference) tends to increase, assuming that other parameters of 
the distribution remain constant. Therefore, as a voter becomes more informed, she is 
more likely to cast her informed vote. This formulation of voter choice presents us with 
a classic heteroscedasticity problem in which the error variance associated with using 
revealed preference as an estimate of informed preference varies systematically across 
observations. If our premise is correct, the error variance will decrease as a respondent's
level of information increases and vice versa. In the empirical analysis that follows, we 
test for and detect this type of heteroscedasticity. 
3.1.1 Estimating voter knowledge 
Our first step in estimating informed preferences is to identify each individual's level of 
information. Our estimations of information level, informed vote, and responsiveness are 
conducted using data from a series of Field Poll surveys taken immediately preceding 
California (state-wide) primary and general elections from 1980 to 1990.14 In these sur­
veys, registered voters were asked a series of questions about some of the ballot measures 
in the upcoming election. Table 1 reports the number and title of each ballot measure 
for which questions were asked. 
Respondents in each of the surveys were asked comparable questions about whether 
or not they had heard of each of the ballot measures listed in Table 1 for the election 
date following their interview. At best, binary responses to these knowledge assessment 
questions are imperfect measures of a respondent's level of information. However, we use 
these responses and the relatively weak assumption that respondents who report having 
heard of a ballot measure are likely to be better informed about it than respondents who 
report not having heard about it to obtain a measure of the respondent's level of infor­
mation. To obtain this measure, we estimate a logit model that relates an individual's 
binary response to her measured socioeconomic characteristics, as follows: 
inf o;i - p (know;j = 1 )  
= ex .. 13, /l + eX"f3'
( 1 )  
14The Field Poll is an independent, non-partisan polling organization. Their surveys consist of tele­
phone interviews with random samples of about 1000 registered California voters. Since the surveys 
sampled registered voters, not citizens, our inferences are limited to the former group. Field Poll data 
were obtained through the Social Science Data Base, University of California, San Diego. 
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Our unit of observation is an individual's response to the knowledge assessment ques­
tion for a single ballot measure. The observed dependent variable, know;i, is a binary 
variable that equals 1 if and only if  respondent i reports that she has heard of measure j. 
The unobserved dependent variable, info;j, is respondent i's level of information about 
proposition j,  estimated as the probability that she responds �yes" to the corresponding 
knowledge assessment question.15 X1; is a vector of personal demographic characteris­
tics.16 Predicted probabilities of a yes response serve as our estimates of a respondent's 
level of information. Table 2 reports these logit coefficients. 
3.1.2 Estimating Informed Votes 
After Field Poll respondents were asked each knowledge assessment question, they were 
then read a brief summary of the corresponding ballot measure and asked to provide 
their vote intentions.17 Like the knowledge assessment questions, vote intentions were 
coded as binary variables. We use our estimates of information level and responses to 
these vote intention questions to estimate each respondent's informed vote on the ballot 
measures about which he or she was asked. 
15We realize that when vigorous campaigns are waged, respondents may be more likely to say they have 
heard of a measure, even if they have little or no content information. In other words, the likelihood 
that a respondent responds "yes" on the knowledge assessment question may he related to the level 
of campaign activity and independent of the information she actually has. Since we are using these 
responses to estimate level of information, which will ultimately be used to create our responsiveness 
measure, it is necessary that our estimates of information be independent of the level of activity in any 
particular campaign. 
If the effects of a vigorous campaign systematically increase the likelihood of a "yes" response on 
knowledge assessment questions (that is, if level of information and campaign activity are not indepen­
dent), then we will be less able to distinguish between informed and uninformed respondents (they will 
all appear to be informed).  As a result, our estimates of informed preferences will be biased towards 
revealed preferences. This means that the relationship between our measures of responsiveness and 
campaign activity will increase and we will be unable to separate the effects of campaign activity on 
responsiveness from the effects of campaign activity on our ability to estimate informed preferences. 
Therefore, we stack all of the knowledge assessment responses into a single data set and estimate 
a single model of information, in effect "averaging" over the effects of any specific campaign. This 
stacking procedure and our interpretation of the coefficient estimates are justified by results of separate 
legit estimations for each measure, as shown in Table 2. These separate estimations show great stability 
in the coefficients on each of the demographic variables and therefore indicate that. the effects of these 
variables are very similar across ballot measures, independent of the measure's content. The constant 
terms, conversely, vary substantially across estimations. 
16Included in this vector are the variables Age, which is measured as the respondent's age in years; 
Educ which is the number of years of education the respondent reports; Gender which is a dummy 
variable coded 1 for males and 0 for female; Race which is a dummy variable coded 1 for non-whites and 
0 for whites; and Owner; which indicates ,home ownership and is coded hf the respondent owns his or 
her home and 0 otherwise. 
170ur 36 cases are all ballot measures about which the Field Poll asked a comparable set. of knowledge 
assessment and vote intention questions. Our cases do not include several ballot measures for which only 
respondents who answered affirmatively on the knowledge assessment questions were asked about their 
vote intentions. In the cases we examine, all respondents who were asked knowledge assessment questions 
were also asked the!r vot-e intention . Respondents who provided nc vote intention '!;'Jere dropped from 
the sample. 
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Our estimation of informed votes follows directly from our initial premise: individuals 
who appear to be relatively well informed are more likely to be casting their informed 
votes. This premise suggests that the difference between a respondent's informed vote 
and their reported vote intention will be greater for respondents with lower levels of 
information and will be smaller for respondents with higher levels of information. It 
follows that when we analyze reported vote intentions for a population of respondents 
with different levels of information, then, all else constant, we expect to observe a smaller 
(greater) variance in the responses of the relatively informed (uninformed) respondents. 
In other words, we expect our error variance to be heteroscedastic. 
To test for the existence and extent of heteroscedasticity and to use this information 
in generating our estimates of informed votes, we use the heteroscedastic logit model, 
developed in Dubin and Zeng 1992. This estimation procedure provides our estimate of 
informed votes by linking a respondent's reported vote intention with her measurable 
socioeconomic characteristics, recognizing the likely differences in error variance between 
respondents with different levels of information. If we find that relatively well informed 
respondents are more likely to be reporting their informed vote (i.e. if we find the type 
of heteroscedasticity the premise suggests), our procedure allows us to place more weight 
on their observations in our informed vote estimation procedure. 
To estimate the heteroscedastic logit, we add a variance parameter to the standard 
logit specification to capture differences in the error variance across individuals. We 
specify the heteroscedastic logit as: 
pref;; - p(vote;; = 1 )  
_ eX2i/32Bi /l + eX2t/328i
(2) 
where p is the probability that an informed voter with socioeconomic characteristics X2;
votes for a particular ballot measure. The heteroscedastic logit simultaneously estimates 
two sets of coefficients, one (/12) that identifies how objective characteristics are related
to reported vote intention across respondents, and a second ( O;) that identifies how the
relationship between informed vote and reported vote intention are related to a respon­
dent's level of information. For identification, we parameterize the relationship between 
the variance in responses and information as an exponential function O; = e''*info; and
estimate a as the variance parameter in the logit estimation.18 
In our application, the value of a reflects the level of error variance that, together with 
the coefficient estimates /3,-maximiretheJikeliM004kat.the,OOseF.ved· data are produced 
18Since we are estimating both the structural parameters and the variance parameter from a single set 
of observations1 identification is especially problematic. For example, a simple linear parameterization 
of 0 such as O; = a *  info; is not likely to be identified. Dubin and Zeng prove that the identification 
conditions for the current parameterization of 0 are met. Estimation of our model is facilitated using the 
Non-Linear Estimatfon procedure in Shazam. We specify the log- densit.y as v; • log(!/(! + e-X;�8• )) +
( 1  - Vi) *  iog(i  - ( i/i + e�x.ee, )) and estimate the parameters f3 and er .  TO verify the robustness of this 
procedure, we also estimate the model using the MLE routine in SST. 
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by the model. In other words, fr is our estimate of the degree of heteroscedasticity. 
Positive, significant estimates for fr suggest that the best model weights observations with 
higher levels of information more heavily in our estimation of informed votes. Positive 
fr's are also evidence of the correctness of our initial premise. 
Before we present the results of our estimation, it is instructive to consider two im­
portant differences between the relatively intuitive heteroscedastic linear regression that 
is often used in empirical political science and the heteroscedastic logit. One important 
difference is that the task of detecting heteroscedasticity is relatively difficult when using 
the logit specification. Consider the linear regression case where it is assumed that the 
dependent variable is accurately observed as a continuous variable. In that case, one can 
test for heteroscedasticity across individual observations by plotting the regression resid­
uals against the level of information. In the non-linear case, however, it is assumed that 
the underlying continuous variable is only partially observed. The partial observation of 
the dependent variable forces us to make an explicit assumption about the distribution 
of the individual errors in order to make inferences about the true value of the underlying 
dependent variable from the observed discrete variable. (In logit estimations, we assume 
that these errors are drawn from a logistic distribution but can not observe these errors 
directly. ) This explicit assumption implies that comparable residuals do not result from 
the logit estimation (they are subsumed in the logit model specification) ,  and so the 
researcher must rely on more complicated detection tests, such as those described here. 
A second important difference between the heteroscedastic linear regression and the 
heteroscedastic logit is that the consequences of uncorrected heteroscedasticity are much 
more severe in the non-linear logit case. In the linear case, the primary consequences 
of uncorrected heteroscedasticity are inflated standard errors, resulting in inefficient but 
still unbiased estimates. In the non-linear case, the resulting coefficient estimates may be 
inconsistent as well, meaning that in the limit, the distribution of the estimator does not 
collapse on the true parameter value.19 In non-technical terms, this means that the esti­
mated coefficients resulting from a logit estimation with uncorrected heteroscedasticity 
are different from the true parameters.20 
19See Hanushek & Jackson 1977, pp. 340-34 1 for a discussion of consistency and other asymptotic 
properties of estimators. 
20In the estimation of a logit model, the relationships between the explanatory variables and the 
continuous dependent variable (that is, the /3's) are dependent on the assumptions we make about the 
relationship between the observed binary dependent variable and the nature of errors. In particular, 
we assume that the errors associated with the dependent variable are well described by a logistic distri­
bution, and the probability that the binary variable takes on a particular value is determined by that 
distribution. In the heteroscedastic logit case, we relax the standard assumption that this error variance 
is constant a.cmss individuals.. Instead,..Jieter-0.5eedasticity ,.m.eans,.that.,,the.fflationship between the bi­
nary observation of the dependent variable (in the current application, the respondent's reported vote 
intention) and the underlying continuous dependent variable (informed votes) varies across observations. 
Since our ability to draw inferences about. the relationships between the explanatory variables and the 
underlying dependent variable (from the estimated coefficients) is dependent on the assumptions we 
make about the errors, it follows that if the assumptions poorly describe the true underlying relation­
ship between the observed and unobserved dependent variables, the inferences we can make (that is, the 
coefficients we estimate) are likely to be inaccurate. The relevance of the differences between maximum 
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Table 3 presents one set of coefficients from our heteroscedastic logit model (the B's). 
Patterns in these coefficients reflect differences in the relationship between the explana­
tory variables and preferences for different ballot measure topics. Table 4 presents the 
heteroscedasticity coefficients, a, that were estimated jointly with the effects reported in 
Table 3. From Table 4, we find strong evidence of heteroscedasticity. The values of a are 
generally positive and statistically significant which implies that relatively well informed 
respondents are more likely to be reporting their informed vote, as the initial premise 
predicts. 
Notice that the last 12 cases, representing the propositions considered in November 
1990, provide the weakest results. The reasons for this difference may be due to the 
unique design of that election's survey. Since there were so many propositions on the 
November 1990 ballot, the Field Poll split its sample and asked half the respondents 
about 6 of the propositions and the other half about the remaining 6. In addition, they 
further split each half-sample and asked the vote intention questions using 2 different 
formats, only one of which was consistent with the question format used in our other 
cases. Therefore, only about 250 respondents were asked their vote intentions in the 
comparable format. Given the complexity of our estimation procedures and the large 
number of parameters we are trying to estimate, it is not surprising that the results are 
weak and probably unreliable for these 12 cases. Subsequent analyses are run both with 
and without the November 1990 cases included. 
We use the /3 coefficients from the heteroscedastic logit to produce our estimate of 
informed votes. To generate these estimates, we take the sum of [the individual's values 
on each of the explanatory variables in equation 2 x the estimated logit coefficient for 
these variables x the estimated weight parameter set to the value of the most informed 
respondent in the sample] . We can interpret these informed vote estimates as the vote 
intentions that a respondent would report if they were able to link their socioeconomic 
characteristics with their vote intentions as well as the most informed respondent in the 
sample (i.e. how the respondent would vote if they understood the policy consequences 
of the electoral outcome as well as the most informed respondent in the sample) .  Our 
informed vote estimates are subsequently aggregated across individuals for each measure 
and serve as our estimates of the outcomes that an informed electorate would produce. 
To facilitate comparison, Table 5 reports actual direct legislation outcomes, reported 
vote intention, and our estimates of informed votes. It is worth noting that respondents 
systematically over-report their intention to vote yes. In every case, the percentage of 
respondents that say they intend to vote in favor of a given proposition is higher than 
the percentage that actually do. This discrepancy might be attributable to the effect of 
differential voter turnout .or .  the. presence of risk-a:v.erse-llilters, _who . .decide to stay with
the status quo once they enter the voting booth. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient 
data to identify the cause of this difference. 
likelihood methods and linear methods for political science is explained in King 1989. 
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3.2 The Second Task: Estimating the Determinants of Re­
sponsiveness 
We now estimate our model of responsiveness. The empirical model, detailed in the 
following equation, posits the responsiveness of direct legislation outcomes as a function 
of campaign activity and ballot measure characteristics. 
Responsiveness - 60 + 61Spend; + 62Spend; * Comp; + 03BigNo; (3) 
+ o4BigYes; + 65Fiscal; + U;, 
where Responsiveness = 1 - !Actuali - Informed; I ·  Actual; is the actual percentage 
of voters who voted in favor of measure j .  Informed; is our estimate of the percent 
of the electorate who would have voted in favor of measure j if they had cast informed 
votes. One minus the absolute value of the difference between Actual; and Informed; 
is our measure of responsiveness for measure j .  From our definition of responsiveness, 
it follows that as the difference between the actual and informed outcomes decreases, 
responsiveness increases. 
Our explanatory variables are intended to operationalize factors identified in the spa­
tial model as affecting responsiveness. Spend; is measured as the total expenditure by 
the side of the electoral debate that spent the most money. We use this measure of 
campaign expenditure as a surrogate for the observable costly effort concept used in the 
spatial model. 21 In California direct legislation elections, money is spent by committees 
formed to support or oppose a particular measure and must be reported to the California 
Fair Political Practices Committee. Spend comes from the campaign expenditure figures 
published by this Committee and is divided by $10,000,000 to scale. As shown in Table 
6, campaign spending ranges from $0 to $24,284,000. 
In our analysis of the spatial model, we found that if greater competition increased the 
credibility of the campaigners, then an increase in competition would lead to an increase 
in responsiveness. To test for any such effect, we add a second term, Spend; * Comp;, 
which conditions Spend; on the relative competition the spender faces. Comp; is defined 
as one minus the absolute value of the percent difference between spending for and against 
the ballot measure: 
C I 
Total Proponent Expenditure - Total Opponent Expenditure 
Iomp = l -
- 'l'-Gtal Proponent .Expenditure + T<>tii.l..Gpponent Expenditure 
When the difference between spending for and against a measure is large (the campaign 
is effectively one-sided) ,  our measure of Comp approaches 0. When the amount spent by 
21 While the magnitude of campaign expenditures does not always become a topic in pre-election 
conversation, we believe that real differences in campaign effort related to expenditure can be observed 
through noticeable differences in the number of paid advertisements. 
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each side is very close, the campaign is considered competitive and our measure of Camp 
approaches 1 .  22 
Except for the extreme case where both campaigners are minimally credible. our 
theoretical findings lead us to predict a positive and relatively large coefficient on Spend* 
Comp, since we believe that responsiveness is likely to be greatest when both sides are 
running vigorous campaigns. In addition, if, as predicted, observable and costly effort 
increases a voter's ability to form more accurate inferences about the policy consequences 
of electoral outcomes, then we also expect the total estimated effect of Spend, [(Spend * 
°Comp) + Spend)), to be positive.
Our theoretical analysis, Lowenstein's ( 1982) convincing argument that direct legisla­
tion voters who are exposed to extremely high amounts of negative (opponent) campaign­
ing are more likely to vote for the already prevailing status quo and Jacobson's ( 1983) 
view that voters treat incumbents and challengers differently all suggest that large cam­
paigns that oppose change are likely to have a greater impact than large campaigns that 
promote change. Two variables, BigN Oj and BigY esi allow us to test this hypothesis. 
BigNoi is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not an opponent of the ballot 
measure waged a "significant" campaign. In 20 of the 36 cases we examine, opponents 
spent small amounts between $0 and $360,101. In the other 16 cases, opponent spending 
was much higher, ranging from $1,135,240 to $24,284,000. We score cases in the first 
group as having little or no substantial opponent spending and cases in the second group 
as having a serious opponent. BigY esi is similarly defined with significant campaigns 
being scored as those where spending for the ballot measure topped $1 .5 million. 
The theory suggests that a big "No" campaign should have a greater effect on voting 
behavior than a big "Yes" campaign. We expect that as BigNo increases, the percentage 
of the actual vote that the measure will receive should decrease. Since the informed vote 
is greater than the actual vote in each of the cases we examine, it follows that an increase 
in BigN o should lead to a decrease in the value of the dependent variable (by decreasing 
Actual.) We expect the effect of BigY es to be much smaller than the effect of BigN o 
and to have the opposite sign (i.e. a big "Yes" campaign increases Actual. )  
Our analysis of the spatial model also suggests that differences in the electorate's prior 
beliefs will affect their ability to determine the relationship between a ballot measure, 
the status quo, and their own well being. In the theoretical discussion, we assumed that 
voter prior beliefs were determined exogenous to the campaign. In the data, however, 
we recognize that differences in non-campaign stimuli may lead voters to form different 
types of prior beliefs across issues. Holding constant campaign attributes, we expect 
voters to be more interested in some types of issues than others. If interested voters 
are more likely to acquire relevant information, then they are more likely to be casting 
informed votes and electoral outcomes are more likely to be responsive, independent of 
22We also included Comp separately in an alternative specification of the model. We found that 
the independent effect of Comp on Responsiveness as indistinguishable from zero, and so to preserve 
degrees of freedom, omit it. from our final specification. 
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the effects of the campaign. Therefore, we include a measure of issue salience to account 
for the fact that voter interest and knowledge of particular ballot measures may vary. 
Fiscal represents the California Legislative Analyst's prediction about the impact of 
the ballot measure on state revenues. Fiscal is scored 1 for measures that the Legisla­
tive Analyst identifies as having a substantial fiscal effect. This includes both revenue­
increasing measures that entail either an increase in taxation or a reduction in some state 
service services, and revenue decreasing or spending measures. Our expectation (which, 
in this case, is not explicitly derived from the theory) is that voters pay more attention 
to fiscal measures - - a positive sign on Fiscal. 23 
Table 7 reports the regression estimates of our empirical model of responsiveness. The
first two rows of coefficients are the result of using the heteroscedastic logit to estimate 
informed voting behavior. To test the robustness of our results to the requirements of 
the heteroscedastic logit, we also estimated the responsiveness model using standard 
weighted logit procedures to estimate informed votes. A comparison of the first two and 
last four data columns not only shows that the relevant coefficients are relatively robust 
to model specification. it also shows that the heteroscedastic logit allowed us to draw 
inferences from a estimation that represented a superior fit of the existing data. In other 
words, the heteroscedastic logit is not only valued because of its relation to the theory, 
it also allows us to do a better job of drawing inferences from the data. 
Column 2 reports the results of the responsiveness regression of primary interest and 
excludes the suspect November 1990 propositions. The effect of high and competitive 
spending (Spend * Comp) is positive, as expected. The effect of spending alone is also 
positive but smaller and not significant. These findings suggest that an increase in the 
magnitude of observable and costly campaign effort tends to lead to greater responsive­
ness and that this effect is greater when the campaign is competitive than it is when the 
campaign is one-sided. 24 
The presence of a strong opposing campaign also has the predicted effect. Notice that 
when opposition spending is high, the actual vote for the measure decreases, while high 
proponent spending has a much smaller effect. We take this as evidence for both our the­
oretical predictions about the effect of opposition spending and the Lowenstein/ Jacobson 
risk-aversion hypotheses. Finally, and contrary to our expectations, the sign on Fiscal 
is negative and significant, suggesting that all else constant voters pay less attention to 
measures with important fiscal impacts. We suspect that qualitative differences between 
measures with and without substantial fiscal effects may be driving this result but leave 
further inquiry to future research. 25 
230ther variables we expect to be related to voter priors were included in alternative specifications of 
the model. However, none of these variables produced substantively or statistically significant effects. 
With only 36 observations, we excluded these variables to preserve degrees of freedom. 
24The theory suggests that an increase in competition will lead to an increase in responsiveness when it 
increases either campaign costs or credibility. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to determine 
whether either of these factors is drivinJ!: the conditional effect of camoai1m exoenditure. 
25Column 3 reports estimates for the ;esponsiveness regression inclu"ding th; November 1990 proposi-
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4 Summary 
We show that whether or not campaign activity can lead to an increase in responsiveness 
depends on whether or not there exist conditions under which campaigns increase the 
likelihood that a voter, who may not make a large investment in the acquisition of relevant 
information, can cast an informed vote. We identify these conditions as the existence of 
costly and observable campaign effort, credible campaigners and the level of competition, 
when competition increases the presence of one of the first two factors. It follows that 
when only when campaigns have these characteristics will campaigns lead to an increase 
in the likelihood that informed votes are cast and electoral outcomes are responsive to 
voter interests. 
The policy consequences of our analysis are straightforward. More responsive electoral 
outcomes are unlikely to be produced by limits on campaigning. Simply restricting 
campaign activity by restricting expenditure will only ensure that confused voters remain 
confused. On the other hand, reforms that encourage campaign activity in order to 
encourage electoral contestants to be responsive to voter interests will only be successful 
if the campaigners have characteristics that allow voter to form more accurate inferences 
about the policy consequences of electoral outcomes. 
tions. (On three of these propositions, the heteroscedastic logit estimate lead to predictions that 100% 
of the respondents would cast affirmative informed votes. These propositions represented cases in which 
overall information was very high and thus the variance in our information variable was small. Given 
these extreme predictions and our existing suspicion of these results due to the small sample sizes for the 
November 1990 propositions, these three propositions are dropped from the analysis.) The main results 
from this regression are very similar to those reported in column 1. We find again that competitive 
spending is strong and significant. The independent effect of spending is again very small and insignifi­
cant, and in this case even slightly negative. The effect of a substantial "No" campaign is negative as in 
column I ,  and the effect of a substantial "Yes" campaign is positive but not significant. Finally, fiscal 
measures are again associated with decreased responsiveness. The R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom is 
lower than in the model in column 2,  but still respectable for social science data. 
Columns 4-7 report alternative specifications of the responsiveness variable. In these alternative 
specifications, informed votes are estimated using a simple weighted logit rather than the heteroscedastic 
logit. To estimate the weighted logit, we simply multiply all the variables for each observation (except 
the binary dependent variable) by the specified weight (as in a weighted regression) and estimated the 
logit model. Columns 4 and 5 report the results of the responsiveness regression in which informed votes 
are estimated using the weighted logit, with 2 different weighting schemes, excluding the November 
1990 propositions. Columns 6 and 7 report the results of the responsiveness regression, using the 
same weighting schemes in a weighted logit estimation of informed votes, including the November 1990 
propositions. In each case, the results based on the weighted logit are similar to those based on the 
heteroscedastic logit. except that the effects are typically smaller (the exception is the independent 
effect of spending), the standard errors on each estimate are higher, and the fit of the models is much 
worse. In fact, in for the models in columns 4 and 5, the R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom is negative. 
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I Election Prop II Title 
June 80 9 Taxation Income - Initiative 
10 Rent Control Initiative 
1 1  Taxation - Surtax - Initiative 
Nov 80 8 Water Resources and Development 
10 Smoking - No Smoking Sections 
June 82 1 New Prison Construction Bond Act 
7 Taxes - Income Tax Indexing 
8 Criminal Justice - "Victims Bill of Rights" 
9 Water Facilities - Peripheral Canal 
Nov 82 9 Schools - Textbooks - Non-Public Schools 
1 1  Beverage Containers Initiative 
12 Bilateral Nuclear Freeze 
13 Water Resources Initiative 
14 Reapportionment 
15 Guns 
June 84 24 Rules, Procedures, Powers, Funding 
June 86 51 Multiple Defendants - Tort Liability Initiative 
June 88 68 Legislative Campaigns - Spending & Contribution Limits
69 AIDS Initiative 
71 Government Spending Limitations 
72 Emergency Reserve - Taxes to Transportation 
73 Campaign Funding 
June 90 108 Passenger Rail & Clean Air Bond Act
1 1 1  Traffic Congestion Relief & Spending Limitation Act
Nov. 90 126 Alcohol Beverage Tax 
128 Environment-Public Health Bonds 
129 Drug Enforcement, Prevention, Treatment, Prisons Bond 
130 Forest Acquisition Bond 
131 Limits on Term Offices, Ethics, Campaign Funding 
133 Drug Enforcement and Prevention 
134 Alcohol Surtax 
135 Pesticide Regulation 
136 State, Local Taxation 
138 Forestry Programs (Bond Act) 
. ··.l-3.9 . Prisan JmnateJ,abor {!I'i>.id]redit)
140 Limits Term Office, Legislative Retirement,
Legislative Operating Costs 
Table 1 :  California Statewide Ballot Propositions 
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I Prop Const
I Stacked -1.46
9 -3.34
10 -1.99
1 1  -2.26 
8 -3.45
10 .63 
1 -3.06
7 -4.33
8 -3.04
9 -1 .40 
9 -1.79
1 1  .64 
12 -.29 
13 -.30 
14 -3.24 
15 2.90 
24 -4.27 
51 -.41 
68 -3.48
69 -1.13 
71 -5.16
72 -4.07 
73 -3.29 
108 -1.44
1 1 1  -2.68
126 -.01 
128 -.42 
129 -.82 
130 .34 
131 -2.57
133 -2.62
134 .64 
135 -.68 
136 -2.35
138 - 1 .00 
' l39 ·3. 17 
140 -3.88
Age/10 Educ/10 Gender Race 
.11 .84 .25 -.15 
.34 2.76 .13 -.12 
.12 1.49 .00 -.33
.13 1.31 . 15 -.25 
.47 1.68 .59 -.65 
.28 .79 -.02 -.20 
.26 1.04 .57 .02 
.22 1.62 .74 -.24 
�."\o . .
.19 1.17 .37 .08 
.19 1.82 .56 -.61 
.17 1.12 -.09 .01 
-.01 1.59 .74 -.78 
.01 1.83 .39 -.38 
.05 .81 .38 - .14 
.16 1.73 .54 -.31 
-.13 .87 .70 -.28 
.30 1.85 .55 -.37 
.17 1.31 .03 -.57
.23 1.04 .70 -.17 
.06 .04 .28 -.30 
.17 2.10 .2'7 -.38 
.33 .84 .46 -.28 
.04 1.39 .24 -.51 
.11 .86 .25 -.42 
.19 1.43 .30 -.26 
. 12 .28 .17 .31 
-.03 1.47 .38 -.85
.09 .24 -.13 . 1 1  
.03 .23 .06 -.68
.20 1.46 .57 -.23 
.08 .87 . 17  .38 
- .13 .66 .30 -.13 
.08 .54 .10 .21 
.19 .49 .50 .03 
.07 1.16 . 12 -.64
.i4 ···oilO 'l'tiJ :05 
.33 2.24 .39 -.30 
Owner N I 
.11 38869 I 
.22 1155 
-.06 1152 
-.08 1 160 
.13 975 
-.06 990 
.25 1003 
.38 1003 
.03 1003 
. 17  1003 
.08 1922 
.12 1922 
. 1 1  1922 
-.03 1922 
.35 1922 
.00 1922 
.20 773 
.21 1256 
.14 448 
.10 443 
.52 439 
.16 440 
-.25 438 
.33 11 .53 
.24 1135 
.13 533 
-.08 579 
-.39 521 
-.31 550 
.21 535 
.03 545 
.61 576 
.08 534 
-.09 530 
.01 526 
;20 562 
-.05 566 
Table 2: Model of Information, Logit Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Knowledge of Ballot Proposition 
Bold faced entries: p < .10, two-tailed test 
24 
I Prop Const Age/10 Gender Race PID Union Inc/10 ldeol North Urban I 
9 
10 
1 1  
8 
1 
7 
8 
9 
9 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
51 
68 
69 
71 
72 
73 
108 
1 1 1  
126 
128 
129 
130 
131 
133 
134 
135 
136 
138 
139 
140 
-.04 .00 .02 -.03 -.01 .00 .05 -.01 .00 
-.60 .01 .10 -.03 -.07 .01 1 .09 - .10 .06 
.62 -.06 -.15 .13 . 17  .22 -.60 .10 .10 
.73 -.03 -.14 . 1 1  .07 .02 -.80 .06 .01 
.05 .00 .01 .04 .02 .08 .51 .09 .01 
.01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
7.56 -.06 -.81 2.44 -5.49 -2.23 5.20 -1 .84 -1 .38 
-.37 .05 -.17 .10 .01 -.03 .58 -.08 -.93 
.04 .02 -.03 . 1 1  -.02 -.08 -.25 -.06 .02 
.00 .00 .00 -.13 -.01 -.05 .16 .22 .15 
.40 -.03 -.16 .06 .13 .01 -.53 .34 .04 
.08 -.01 -.03 -.03 .00 .01 -.04 .05 .04 
- .12 .01 .08 -.07 -.04 -.07 .01 .01 .03 
-3.54 .38 -2.72 2.67 .49 -.65 -1 .48 3.84 2.26 
-.03 .01 .01 -.02 -.03 -.03 .13 -.02 .02 
.37 .06 -.06 .03 -.21 .17 - .18 .26 .42 
- .12 .02 .02 .00 -.02 .01 -.07 -.05 -.01 
.36 -.08 -.36 .22 .19 .13 .22 .46 .18 
.28 .03 .09 -.023 -.22 -.25 -.17 -.16 - .17 
.03 .00 -.01 -.01 .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 
1 .75 -.23 . 1 1  -.08 .29 *** .35 .55 .05 
.97 -.13 -.03 .30 .18 *** .23 .14 .07 
.69 . 109 -.69 .44 .28 * * *  -.09 .21 - . 11  
.63 -.36 -.43 -.30 .83 *** -.93 .46 -.09 
3.62 -.02 -.10 -.58 .52 *** .37 -.07 . 1 1  
.37 -.20 -.15 - .19 .34 *** - .18 .49 .07 
-2.10 - .15 .03 .11  .22 *** -.26 -.58 .28 
2.33 -.02 -.35 -.36 .21 *** .88 -.28 -.16 
- . 17  .07 -.12 .10 -.07 *** -.10 .26 -.28 
-1 . 14 -.09 .22 .44 .16 * * *  -.61 .51 .20 
.41 .02 .16 -.46 - .14 *** -.56 -.40 .04 
4.27 -.25 .12 .58 .20 *** -.18 . 1 1  .01 
.95 -.01 -.36 -.62 .21 *** .66 -.88 .26 
2.05 -.09 -.28 -.55 -.28 *** -.35 -.18 . 10  
Table 3 :  Model of Informed Preferences, Heteroscedastic Logit Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Reported Vote Intention 
IJ = exp( a *  Info) 
25 
.01 
.08 
-.08 
.06 
-.04 
.00 
.88 
.21 
.08 
-.04 
. 1 1  
.03 
.05 
1.40 
-.03 
.18 
-.03 
. 17  
.04 
.01 
.42 
.08 
-.55 
.38 
-.13 
.38 
.62 
.38 
.01 
.25 
.22 
.47 
.93 
.17 
I Prop Estimated a Standard Error I 
9 7.4275 ( 1 .4498) 
10 2.2035 ( 1.6892) 
1 1  1 .5249 ( 1 .8433) 
8 2.6972 ( 1 .2558) 
1 1 .9448 ( 1 .8702) 
7 7.7128 (4.3043) 
8 -3.5818 ( 1 .5265) 
9 1. 7674 ( .9109) 
9 2.0058 ( 1 .8680) 
11  1 .5640 (2.3469) 
12 2.1078 ( .9462) 
13 4.5512 (2.0406) 
14 3.8206 (2.0249) 
15 -3.4900 ( 1.3370) 
51 3.9916 (1 .6308) 
68 .6455 (2.4149) 
69 4.7315 ( 1.5957) 
71 1 .3576 (1 .  7523) 
72 1.2565 (3.4965) 
73 6.2930 (2.2241)  
108 1 .2061 ( .7525) 
1 1 1  1 .0397 (.6429) 
126 .5108 (3. 1116) 
128 -2.4347 (3.3564) 
129 5. 7721 (3.6228) 
130 -1.0364 (3.4209) 
131 -4.0016 (3.3276) 
133 4.1899 (3.2293) 
134 -.81 16 (3.1449) 
135 -1 .  7601 (3.5675) 
136 1 .2607 (3.3594) 
138 6.2979 (3.5278) 
139 1.2248 (3.8201) 
140 .8989 (3.3948) 
Table 4: Model of Informed Preferences, Heteroscedastic Logit Estimates of a 
Estimated Jointly with Table 3 Estimates 
() = exp( a *  Info) 
Bold faced entries: p < .10, two-tailed test 
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I Prop Actual Reported Informed I 
9 .3920 .3884 .1813 
10 .3540 .3871 .3202 
1 1  .4430 .6053 .6455 
8 .5380 .8100 .9006 
10  .4660 .5451 **** 
1 .5610 .6318 . .  6969 
7 .6350 .5774 .. 8597 
8 .5640 .7092 .6159 
9 .3730 .3933 .4048 
9 .6110 .5738 .6107 
1 1  .4410 .4962 .5075 
12 .5230 .5345 .5829 
13 .3520 .5757 .6750 
14 .4550 .4694 .4269 
15 .3720 .4186 .4542 
24 .5310 .4816 **** 
51 .6210 .5966 .5961 
68 .5280 .7814 .81 13 
69 .3200 .2762 .1487 
71 .4890 .5772 .6049 
72 .3850 .6460 .6706 
73 .5810 .6683 .8891 
108 .5600 .6568 .9047 
1 1 1  .5200 .5529 .7887 
126 .4092 .5305 .6238 
128 .3565 .4643 .4444 
129 .2766 .4867 .9999 
130 .4787 .5234 .4443 
131 .3775 .5516 .4990 
133 .3187 .5318 .9999 
134 .3103 .5800 .4913 
135 .3040 .4025 .41 14 
136 .4788 .4506 .7569 
138 .2884 .4528 .9999 
139 :54{)5 .1'245 ·-.9694
140 .5217 .7093 .9375 
Table 5: Actual Direct Legislation Returns, Reported Vote Intention, and Estimated 
Informed Preferences 
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Prop SpendYes SpendNo BigNo Fiscal I 
9 3,633,570 1,777,740 1 1 
10 6,655,210 178,271 0 0 
1 1  455,899 5,611,460 1 1 
hline 8 62,402 360,101 0 0 
10 797,133 2,732,010 1 0 
1 0 30,729 0 1 
7 475,664 l ,U74 0 1 
8 90,842 54,286 0 1 
9 2,789,920 3,184,880 1 1 
9 595,489 10,175 0 0 
1 1  666,975 5,133,860 l 0 
12 2,627,270 6,041 0 0 
13 624,607 2,028,760 1 1 
14 222,654 0 0 0 
15 1,781,270 6,367,470 1 0 
24 96,610 329,723 0 1 
51 4,878,830 4,930,050 1 1 
68 1,038,760 1,135,240 1 1 
69 170,377 279,844 0 1 
71 2,519,520 244,564 0 1 
72 2,832,820 199,942 0 1 
73 335,136 1,135,240 1 1 
108 452,262 0 0 1 
1 11  6,490,700 0 0 1 
126 3.299,410 0 0 1 
128 5,737,870 13,1 16,800 1 1 
129 1 ,100,180 20,387 0 1 
130 7,079,960 5,608,950 1 1 
131 1 ,164,610 2,347,750 1 0 
133 802,581 0 0 0 
134 1 ,896,900 24.284,000 1 1 
135 5,681,160 0 0 1 
136 1 1,023,000 95,886 0 0 
138 5,608,950 7,079,960 1 1 
139 1 ,326,lHJ 282,122 0 1 
140 1 ,953,700 2,347,750 1 1 
Table 6: Model of Direct Legislation Responsiveness, Explanatory Variables 
28 
j Variable II Coll Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Constant .9011 .8839 .9200 .9205 .9311 .9314 
( .0521) (.0472) (.0387) ( .0390) ( .0322) ( .0324) 
Spending .0490 -.0084 .0672 .0674 -.0627 -.0623 
( .1633) ( .0543) (.0371) ( .0373) ( . 1267) { .1278) 
Spend*Comp .3125 .2133 . 1668 .1662 . 1026 .1026 
( .1589) ( .0987) (.1230) (.1240) (.0675) ( .0679) 
BigNo -.0951 -.0595 -.0731 -.0723 -.0490 -.0484 
( .0772) (.0590) (.0574) (.0579) ( .0403) (.0405) 
Big Yes -.0091 .0128 -.0063 -.0065 .0459 .0459 
(.0781 ) ( .0545) (.0601)  ( .0607) (.0372) ( .0374) 
Fiscal -.1157 -.1144 -.0282 -.0292 -.0504 -.0513 
(.0526) (.0474) ( .0383) ( .0386) ( .0324) ( .0326) 
N 22 31 24 24 31 31 
R2 .2181 .1565 -.0342 -.0376 . 1 141 . 1120 
Table 7: Model of Direct Legislation Responsiveness, OLS Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Responsiveness = 1 - !Actual - Informed! 
Col 1 :  Excludes November 1990 Propositions, (} = exp( a *  Info) 
Col 2: Includes November 1990 Propositions, (} =  exp( a *  Info) 
Col 3: Excludes Nov 1990, Informed votes estimated using weighted logit, w = Info 
Col 4: Excludes Nov 1990, Informed votes estimated using weighted logit, w = exp(Info) 
Col 5: Includes Nov 1990, Informed votes estimated using weighted logit, w = Info 
Col 6: Includes Nov 1990, Informed votes estimated_using wcighted.logit , w = exp( Info) 
Bold faced entries: p < .05, two-tailed test 
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FIGURE 2: 
Updated Beliefs from the Observation of Costly Effort 
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FIGURE 3: 
Updated Beliefs from the Observation of a Minimally 
Credible Campaign Message 
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FIGURE 4: 
Updated Beliefs from the Observation of a Perfectly 
Credible Campaign Message 
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FIGURE S: 
Relationship Between Theoretical and Empirical Concepts 
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